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When	Do	Local	Governments	Regulate	Land	Use	to	Serve	
Regional	Goals?	Results	of	a	Survey	Tracking	Land	Use	
Changes	that	Support	Sustainable	Mobility	
EXECUTIVE	SUMMARY	
An	unprecedented	effort	to	improve	regional	coordination	and	land	use	governance	has	been	
underway	in	California	since	2008,	when	the	state	passed	the	Sustainable	Communities	and	
Climate	Protection	Act	(Senate	Bill	375).		The	law	complements	earlier	state	policy	(Assembly	
Bill	32)	to	reduce	statewide	greenhouse	gas	emissions	across	an	array	of	sectors.		SB	375	
specifically	encourages	regional	land	use	planning	that,	when	coupled	with	supportive	
transportation	investments,	would	help	to	reduce	automobile	dependent	patterns	of	land	use	
and	sprawl.		Implementation	of	these	new	regional	land	use	visions	and	the	GHG	reductions	
they	promise	depend	largely	on	local	government	land	use	and	development	actions.	
This	report	explores	the	responses	of	California	cities	and	counties	to	this	experiment	in	order	
to	understand	what	may	make	local	governments	more	or	less	likely	to	collaborate	with	
regionally	oriented	policies.		It	reports	on	a	survey	of	California	local	governments	administered	
in	early	2017	and	explores	two	main	questions:	(1)	to	what	extent	are	California	local	
governments	adopting	local	land	use	policy	and	development	decisions	that	reflect	the	MPO’s	
regional	land	use	vision,	and	(2)	what	factors	make	some	local	governments	more	likely	to	
cooperate	with	regional	land	use	visions,	and	what	factors	make	others	less	likely	to	do	so?	
A	key	finding	is	that	California	cities	have	not	uniformly	included	land	use	strategies	to	promote	
smart	growth	in	their	zoning	codes	(see	Table	ES-1.)		Indeed,	some	cities	report	using	all	eight	
strategies	we	asked	about,	while	others	used	none.		Cities	responding	to	the	survey	had	
adopted	on	average	about	five	of	the	eight	key	land	use	strategies	included	in	the	survey.	
Table	ES.1.	Adoption	of	Smart	Growth	Strategies	in	City	and	County	Zoning	Codes	
	 Total	 	 City	 	 County	
	 No	 Yes	 n	 	 No	 Yes	 n	 	 No	 Yes	 n	
Increased	Building	Densities	(Q7.1)	 16.4	 83.6	 177	 	 16.1	 83.9	 155	 	 18.2	 81.8	 22	
Increased	Building	Heights	(Q7.2)	 43.7	 56.3	 174	 	 44.7	 55.3	 152	 	 36.4	 63.6	 22	
Infill	Development	(Q7.3)	 9.6	 90.4	 177	 	 9.7	 90.3	 155	 	 9.1	 90.9	 22	
Urban	Growth	Boundary	(Q7.4)	 64.7	 35.3	 173	 	 68.2	 31.8	 151	 	 40.9	 59.1	 22	
Mixed-Use	Development	(Q7.5)	 8.5	 91.5	 176	 	 9.1	 90.9	 154	 	 4.5	 95.5	 22	
Transit-Oriented	Development	(Q7.6)	 42.4	 57.6	 172	 	 44.0	 56.0	 150	 	 31.8	 68.2	 22	
Reduce/Eliminate	Min.	Parking	Requirements	(Q7.7)	 41.6	 58.4	 173	 	 43.0	 57.0	 151	 	 31.8	 68.2	 22	
Agricultural	/	Open	Space	Land	Preservation	(Q7.8)	 26.7	 73.3	 176	 	 29.9	 70.1	 154	 	 4.5	 95.5	 22	
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We	also	learned	from	preliminary	models	about	factors	that	appear	to	increase	adoption	of	
smart	growth	oriented	zoning	(see	Table	ES-2).		Local	governments	that	report	awareness	of,	
engagement	in,	and	favorable	perceptions	of	the	regional	planning	process	all	support	
increased	adoption	of	SB	375	land	use	strategies.		Additionally,	increases	in	the	presence	of	
Green	Party-registered	voters	and	in	population	size	are	also	positively	correlated	with	SB	375-
favorable	outcomes.			
	
Table	ES-2.	What	Factors	Influence	Local	Adoption	of	Smart	Zoning	Strategies?	
	 Influence	on	City	Adoption		
of	Smart	Growth	Zoning	Strategies	
Factors		
(Theoretical	basis)	
Expected	 Observed	
Implementation	risks	/	costs	anticipated	by	locals		
(Feiock)	
-	 	
Implementation	benefits	anticipated	by	locals		
(Feiock)	
+	 	
Organizational	capacity	(planning	staff)	
(Gerber	&	Gibson;	Deyle	&	Wiedenmann)	
+	 -	
Previous	regional	collaboration	
(Lubell,	Gerber,	Henry)	
+	 	
Local	understanding	of	reg’l	vision	/vision	communication	
(Sabatier	&	Mazmanian)	
+	 +	
Participation	in	developing	regional	vision	
(Sabatier	&	Mazmanian)	
+	 +	
Control	variables	 	 	
Population	 +	 +	
Local	growth	rate	(2010-2016)	 -	 	
Median	HH	income	 +/-	 	
Political	orientation	majority	Republican/Libertarian	 -	 	
Charter	city	(0,1)	 -	 	
Key:	 +				factor	increases	the	likelihood	a	city	will	adopt	these	smart	growth	zoning	strategies	
- factor	decreases	the	likelihood	a	city	will	adopt	these	smart	growth	zoning	strategies	
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Other	key	findings	from	the	survey	are	summarized	below	and	explained	in	greater	detail	in	the	
report	and	its	appendix.		
• A	majority	of	both	county	and	city	planning	managers	report	that	SB	375	had	little	to	no	
impact	on	actions	by	their	city	to	adopt	or	strengthen	the	eight	smart	growth	strategies	
asked	about	in	the	survey.		Responses	to	this	effect	were	especially	pronounced	for	the	use	
of	urban	growth	boundaries	and	of	ag-land	and	open	space	preservation,	suggesting	that	
cities	may	have	been	motivated	to	support	such	strategies	for	other	reasons,	perhaps	even	
before	SB	375	(Table	A-3).	
• At	the	same	time,	a	majority	of	cities	and	counties	report	that	SB	375	has	led	to	increased	
communication	among	local	governments	and	other	actors	about	land	use	issues	and	has	
led	them	to	participate	more	in	the	regional	planning	process	(Table	A-11).	
• When	asked	about	the	eight	smart	growth	land	use	strategies,	relatively	few	local	
governments	anticipate	that	SB	375	will	have	a	substantial	impact	on	their	cities	in	terms	of	
specific	costs	or	benefits	(Table	A-4).	
• A	majority	of	local	governments	report	participating	in	the	RTP/SCS	process	and	say	that	
their	input	was	given	reasonable	consideration	by	the	MPO	(Table	A-5).	
• Local	government	responses	suggest	that	information	costs	are	not	a	notable	deterrent	to	
collaboration	on	SB	375.		Nearly	two-thirds	to	almost	90%	of	MPOs	report	sharing	various	
forms	of	local	land	use	information	with	their	MPO	(Table	A-7).		Also,	a	majority	of	cities	
and	counties	report	that	it	is	easy	to	learn	about	the	development	decisions	of	neighboring	
local	governments	(Table	A-8).	
• At	the	same	time,	many	local	governments	anticipate	defection	from	neighboring	local	
governments,	i.e.,	that	neighboring	jurisdictions	will	ignore	the	RTP/SCS	when	making	
development	decisions	(Table	A-5,	Q5.8).	
• Only	about	one-fifth	of	responding	local	governments	report	no	experience	at	all	
collaborating	with	other	jurisdictions	on	various	issues	asked	about	in	the	survey.		The	
majority	of	cities	and	counties	report	some	experience	with	collaboration,	but	very	few	say	
that	they	collaborate	a	great	deal	with	other	jurisdictions	or	stakeholders	(Table	A-9).	
• Roughly	one-quarter	to	one-third	of	local	governments	are	not	aware	of	the	various	state	
and	regional	grant	programs	available	to	support	implementation	of	the	SCS	(Table	A-10).		
In	contrast,	somewhat	similar	shares	report	receiving	fund	awards	from	these	programs.	
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Introduction:	Regional	Land	Use	Governance	as	an	Institutional	
Collective	Action	Problem	
Local	authority	over	land	use	planning	and	development	is	a	defining	feature	of	U.S.	
government.		Cities	and	towns	craft	the	general	plans	that	provide	longer	term	roadmaps	for	
future	growth,	and	they	adopt	the	zoning	ordinances	and	other	laws	that	guide	where	and	how	
development	may	occur	within	their	jurisdictional	boundaries.		Local	jurisdictions	derive	this	
authority	from	general	police	powers,	which	enable	states	and	local	governments	to	regulate	
behavior	and	enforce	order	within	their	territory	for	the	betterment	of	the	health,	safety,	and	
general	welfare	of	their	inhabitants1.		
	
Many	problems	faced	by	local	governments	today,	however,	span	well	beyond	a	single	
jurisdiction's	boundaries.		Consider	general	challenges	related	to	housing	affordability,	
economic	development,	groundwater	management,	sea	level	rise,	or	managing	freight	
corridors.		Local	governments	exercising	land	use	authority	without	mechanisms	for	
coordination	with	neighboring	jurisdictions	can	result	in	environmental	harms,	inefficiencies,	
and	spillover	problems	across	a	metropolitan	region.		For	example,	one	city’s	decision	to	
approve	development	of	a	regional	retail	center	on	its	edge	may	increase	its	own	tax	revenue	
but	add	to	regional	automobile	traffic	and	related	air	pollution	and	greenhouse	gas	emissions	
(GHGs)	impacting	neighboring	jurisdictions.	Alternatively,	consider	a	traditional	low-density	
suburban	city	where	attractive	employers	have	clustered	and	where	job	growth	is	exploding.		If	
the	city	seeks	to	preserve	the	character	of	its	low-density	residential	neighborhoods	rather	than	
to	zone	for	expanded	housing	opportunities,	workers	may	have	to	locate	far	from	jobs,	
experience	long	commutes,	and	add	to	regional	vehicle	miles	travelled	(VMT),	highway	
congestion,	and	GHG	emissions.	
		
In	these	and	other	examples,	the	partitioning	of	land	use	and	development	decision-making	
authority	among	a	region’s	cities	and	counties	creates	a	form	of	institutional	collective	action	
problem	(Feiock	2013).		One	government	taking	land	use	and	development	actions	in	its	own	
self-interest	can	hinder	outcomes	that	are	regionally	efficient	or	beneficial.		
	
An	unprecedented	effort	to	improve	regional	coordination	and	land	use	governance	has	been	
underway	in	California	since	2008,	when	the	state	passed	the	Sustainable	Communities	and	
Climate	Protection	Act	(Senate	Bill	375).		The	law	complements	earlier	state	policy	(Assembly	
Bill	32)	to	reduce	statewide	greenhouse	gas	emissions	across	an	array	of	sectors.		SB	375	
specifically	encourages	regional	land	use	planning	that,	when	coupled	with	supportive	
transportation	investments,	would	help	to	reduce	automobile	dependent	patterns	of	land	use	
and	sprawl.		Implementation	of	these	new	regional	land	use	visions,	and	hence	the	GHG	
reductions	they	promise,	depend	largely	on	local	government	land	use	and	development	
actions.	
																																																						
1	Ambler	Realty	Co.	vs.	Village	of	Euclid,	272	U.S.	365	(1926).	
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This	paper	explores	the	responses	of	California	cities	and	counties	to	this	experiment	as	a	way	
of	contributing	new	insights	about	what	makes	local	governments	more	or	less	likely	to	
collaborate	with	regionally	oriented	policies.		It	reports	the	results	of	a	survey-based	study	of	
California	local	governments	administered	in	early	2017.		The	study	examines	two	main	
questions:	(1)	to	what	extent	are	California	local	governments	adopting	local	land	use	policy	
and	development	decisions	that	reflect	the	MPO’s	regional	land	use	vision,	and	(2)	what	factors	
make	some	local	governments	more	likely	to	cooperate	with	regional	land	use	visions,	and	
what	factors	make	others	less	likely	to	do	so?	
	
In	the	sections	that	follow,	we	first	explain	how	California’s	SB	375	works,	what	new	regional	
approaches	to	land	use	planning	the	law	implies,	and	why	it	provides	a	valuable	opportunity	to	
observe	local	government	behavior	within	an	institutional	collective	action	problem	framework.		
Next,	we	discuss	the	literature	and	theory	surrounding	institutional	collective	action	and	
collaborative	regional	governance	problems	and	explain	how	this	literature	informs	the	
hypotheses	about	local	government	behavior	that	we	test	in	our	study.	We	present	our	study	
methods	in	a	third	section,	which	describes	our	2017	survey	of	California	local	governments	and	
the	dependent,	independent,	and	control	variables	used	to	operationalize	the	outcomes	of	
interest	and	their	determinants.		Finally,	we	report	the	results,	which	suggest	that	cities	do	not	
uniformly	include	in	their	zoning	codes	land	use	strategies	to	promote	smart	growth,	and	that	
only	a	small	number	of	factors	appear	to	have	a	significant	effect	on	how	extensively	a	city	uses	
smart	growth	strategies	in	its	zoning.					
Background:	California’s	Experiment	with	Regional	Land	Use	
Governance	
California’s	2008	Sustainable	Communities	and	Climate	Protection	Act	(SB	375)	aims	to	curtail	
transportation-related	GHG	emissions	by	reducing	the	amount	of	driving	that	Californians	do	to	
accomplish	their	daily	activities.		This	approach	separates	SB	375	from	other	state	laws	that	
would	reduce	transportation-related	GHG	emissions	by	requiring	or	incentivizing	more	fuel-
efficient	motor	vehicles	or	by	reducing	the	carbon	content	of	vehicle	fuels	themselves.		In	
contrast,	SB	375	takes	aim	specifically	at	land	use	and	development	practices	that	promote	
sprawl	and	perpetuate	automobile-dependent	communities.			
	
California’s	metropolitan	planning	organizations	(MPOs),	the	federally	required	regional	bodies	
that	plan	for	and	allocate	federal	funds	to	regional	transportation	investments,	play	an	
important	but	somewhat	symbolic	role	in	carrying	out	SB	375.		The	law	requires	MPOs	to	
develop	a	new	component,	called	the	Sustainable	Communities	Strategy	(SCS),	of	their	long-
range	regional	transportation	plans	(RTP).		The	SCS	must	include	a	regional	land	development	
forecast	that,	when	paired	with	planned	transportation	investments,	will	reduce	automobile	
reliance	and	associated	transportation-related	GHG	emissions.			
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In	short,	MPOs	must	develop	a	region-serving	land	use	vision	that	would	reduce	automobile	
dependency.		A	central	paradox	of	SB	375,	however,	is	that	the	law	explicitly	upholds	local	
government	authority	over	land	use.		Implementation	of	any	MPO’s	regional	land	use	vision	
thus	depends	entirely	on	the	voluntary	cooperation	of	the	region’s	member	cities	and	counties.		
This	fact	has	led	some	to	observe	that	SB	375	“produces	a	mismatch	between	authority	and	
responsibility,	expecting	more	from	MPOs	than	they	can	easily	achieve”	(Barbour	&	Deakin,	
2012,	83).		Indeed,	a	recent	study	of	the	regional	land	use	“Blueprint	Plan”	in	the	Sacramento	
region	shows	that	housing	constructed	post-plan	diverged	visibly	from	the	collaboratively	
developed	regional	growth	principles	stressing	mixed-use,	compact	development,	and	
transportation	choice	(Allred	&	Chakraborty,	2015).	
	
SB	375	does	anticipate,	however,	that	the	state’s	18	MPOs	will	leverage	the	federal	
transportation	funds	at	their	disposal	to	reward	local	land	use	decisions	compatible	with	their	
SCS	and	with	SB	375’s	GHG	reduction	goals.		The	law	cannot	ensure	that	local	governments’	
zoning	and	development	choices	will	align	with	the	region’s	land	use	vision.		Instead,	it	suggests	
in	principle	that	local	governments	making	SCS-compatible	land	use	and	development	choices	
stand	to	benefit	more	from	MPO-directed	federal	funds	than	those	local	governments	that	do	
not.			
	
Because	SB	375	looks	to	regional	growth	patterns	to	temper	automobile	use	and	GHG	
emissions	in	California,	it	raises	the	stakes	for	understanding	the	drivers	of	the	local	
government	land	use	and	development	decisions	that	produce	those	regional	growth	patterns.		
This	study	therefore	seeks	to	understand	two	main	questions.		First,	it	explores	the	extent	to	
which	California	local	governments	are	adopting	local	land	use	policy	and	development	
decisions	that	reflect	the	MPO’s	regional	land	use	vision.		Second,	it	asks	what	factors	might	
make	some	California	local	governments	more	likely	to	cooperate	with	regional	land	use	visions	
than	others.	
	
	
Theoretical	Framework	
We	view	Feiock’s	theory	of	institutional	collective	action	(ICA)	problems	as	directly	applicable	to	
the	problem	of	local	implementation	of	regional	land	use	visions	in	California	(2013).		According	
to	Feiock,	ICA	problems	result	from	the	division	or	partitioning	of	authority	in	which	decisions	
by	one	government	in	a	specific	area	impact	other	governments.		Because	MPOs	have	no	
authority	to	enforce	their	regional	land	use	visions	(the	Sustainable	Community	Strategy),	they	
must	rely	on	the	actions	of	the	various	cities	and	counties	within	their	regional	planning	
boundaries	for	implementation.		Local	governments,	however,	may	look	more	to	their	
individual	rather	than	regional	interests	when	making	land	use	and	development	decisions.		For	
instance,	various	self-interested	factors	may	drive	local	government	land	use	decisions:	
• to	increase	the	jurisdiction’s	tax	base	(fiscalization	of	land	use)	(Lewis,	2001);	
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• to	preserve	local	community	character	(and	potentially	to	thwart	change	bringing	more	
affordable	housing	or	density);	and		
• to	approve	development	that	serves	local	needs	but	creates	spillover	impacts	in	
neighboring	jurisdictions	and	the	wider	region	(e.g.	inefficient	transportation,	automobile	
dependent	development,	traffic	congestion,	more	VMT).				
					
Regional	land	use	governance	under	the	SB	375	framework	creates	what	Feiock	calls	a	
horizontal	collective	action	problem,	where	individual	governments	make	land	use	decisions	
that	produce	externalities	that	can	spill	across	jurisdictional	boundaries.		The	land	use	choices	
of	one	city	acting	without	regard	to	the	MPO’s	forecasted	regional	development	pattern	can	
undermine	other	jurisdictions’	actions	to	implement	land	use	and	development	supporting	the	
regional	SCS.		Further,	one	city’s	narrowly	self-interested	land	use	strategies	could	produce	
externalities	or	spillovers	for	neighboring	jurisdictions	in	the	region.		Some	jurisdictions	adopt	
land	use	decisions	largely	to	increase	local	tax	benefits,	for	instance,	regardless	of	regional	
automobile	travel,	GHGs,	or	housing	pressures	generated	by	such	decisions.				
	
A	handful	of	studies	by	urban	planning	scholars	have	examined	why	some	jurisdictions	adopt	or	
implement	smart	growth	or	sustainable	land	use	plans	and	policies	while	others	do	not.	Works	
of	this	kind	do	not	examine	regional-local	collaboration	issues	or	measure	policy	adoption	per	
se,	but	some	explore	the	local	factors	associated	with	it.	Rapid	population	growth,	for	instance,	
correlates	to	the	adoption	of	local	land	use	controls	in	some	studies	(Boarnet,	2011;	Wassmer	
&	Lacscher,	2006),	but	not	others	(Baldassare	&	Wilson,	1996).	Additionally,	high	income	may	
(Brody	et	al.,	2006)	or	may	not	(O’Connell,	2009;	Nguyen,	2009)	increase	the	likelihood	of	
community	support	for	growth	controls.	Other	work	has	postulated	the	causal	pathways	
through	which	plans	effect	outcomes,	including	the	potential	for	plans	to	coordinate	
interdependent	decisions,	increase	decision	makers’	knowledge,	shape	or	re-aggregate	
preferences,	and	deter	non-compliant	actions	(Millard-Ball,	2012).		
	
Drawing	on	ICA	theory	and	its	conceptualization	of	collaboration	costs	and	benefits,	and	on	
practical	and	theoretical	insights	from	collaborative	governance	and	policy	implementation	
literatures,	we	hypothesize	that	several	factors	will	lead	local	governments	to	adopt	land	use	
decisions	supporting	the	regional	land	use	vision	and	the	VMT	and	GHG	reductions	it	targets.	
	
We	use	these	hypotheses	first	and	foremost	to	develop	a	descriptive	portrait	of	California	local	
governments,	their	local	land	use	practices,	and	their	involvement	in	the	planning,	
development,	and	implementation	of	the	regional	land	use	vision,	the	Sustainable	Communities	
Strategy.		Additionally,	we	develop	exploratory	models	to	test	these	hypotheses,	and	to	assess	
whether	empirical	evidence	from	our	survey	supports	to	our	expectations.			
Factors	Expected	to	Influence	Local	Adoption	of	Smart	Growth	Land	Use	Policies	
1. Calculus	of	Benefits	–	We	anticipate	that	local	governments	will	make	land	use	decisions	
supporting	SB	375	when	the	perceived	risks	of	doing	so	are	low	and	when	the	perceived	
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benefits	are	high.		Central	to	Feiock’s	theory	of	institutional	collective	action	is	the	
importance	of	“how	local	government	officials	perceive	and	weigh	the	various	costs	and	
benefits	of	joint	action	as	they	contemplate…	intergovernmental	collaboration.”			
	
How	do	local	governments	perceive	the	costs	and	benefits	to	them	of	aligning	local	land	use	
with	regional	land	development	plans	to	reduce	auto-dependent	sprawl?		We	anticipate	
that	a	local	government	will	move	to	increase	density,	zone	for	mixed	uses,	expand	
affordable	housing,	or	restrict	development	on	unprotected	natural	lands	when	it	believes	
such	actions	will	provide	economic,	environmental,	or	social	equity	benefits,	for	instance	by	
attracting	new	businesses,	improving	air	quality,	or	increasing	housing	supply.			
	
Other	collective	action-based	studies	suggest	that	trust	among	actors	(or	“trust	networks”)	
may	reduce	the	perceived	risks	of	joint	action	(Lubell,	2007).		Thus,	we	ask	whether	local	
governments	are	well	informed	about	the	land	use	and	development	preferences	of	other	
jurisdictions	in	their	region;	if	a	city	denies	development	approval	to	an	automobile-
dependent	retail	center,	forsaking	associated	tax	revenues,	does	it	know	whether	its	
neighboring	jurisdictions	will	do	the	same?			
	
2. Calculus	of	Information	Costs	–	Following	Feiock	and	ICA,	we	assume	that	local	governments	
will	be	more	likely	to	adopt	land	use	practices	supporting	the	regional	vision	when	other	
local	governments	will	act	predictably.		Thus,	whether	one	local	government	can	know	
when	its	neighboring	cities	are	cooperating	with	or	defecting	from	the	regional	plan	is	
important.		We	measure	this	by	asking	local	governments	if	they	agree	or	disagree	that	it	is	
easy	for	their	jurisdiction	to	learn	about	land	use	planning	and	development	decisions	in	
other	cities	in	the	region.		Cities	that	can	easily	know	about	neighboring	cities’	land	use	
planning	and	development	activities	may	perceive	lower	risks	to	complying	with	the	SCS.			
	
3. Local	Government	Capacity	–	As	local	governments	increase	their	staff	and	technical	
capacity,	we	expect	their	ability	to	participate	in	plan	development	will	increase,	as	will	
their	ability	to	understand	the	SCS	and	its	implications,	and	to	adjust	land	use	and	
development	practices	to	reflect	regional	planning	vision.		We	operationalize	capacity	as	the	
number	of	planners	employed	by	the	local	government,	as	reported	in	the	Annual	Planning	
Survey	(APS)	published	by	the	California	Governor’s	Office	of	Planning	and	Research.		In	the	
APS	results,	California	cities	report	having	as	few	as	zero	staff	planners	in	small	cities	and	as	
many	as	200	planners,	as	in	the	City	of	Los	Angeles.		Twelve	cities	report	relying	on	an	
external	contractor(s)	rather	than	dedicated	city	staff	for	planning	services.		
	
4. Experience	with	Regional	Collaboration	–	We	anticipate	that	a	local	government	will	be	
more	likely	to	collaborate	with	the	MPO’s	GHG-reducing	regional	land	use	vision	when	it	
has	been	involved	in	pre-existing	regional	collaborative	efforts	on	other	issues,	especially	
environmental	or	resource	issues,	such	as	water	management	or	habitat	conservation.		Our	
expectation	follows	work	by	Lubell,	Gerber,	and	Henry	(2013).		
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5. Local	Autonomy	/	Charter	City	Status	–	California	state	law	allows	cities	to	adopt	their	own	
charter	and	thereby	to	adopt	their	own	organizational	structures.		Charter	adoption	signals	
a	city’s	desire	for	more	local	autonomy	and	its	ability	to	act	independently	from	some	state	
laws	(Godwin	&	Godinez,	2010)	and	to	be	more	responsive	to	residents’	demands	(Kim,	
2015).		We	anticipate	that	local	governments	that	have	adopted	their	own	charter	prize	
local	independence	and	may	do	less	to	support	of	statewide	climate	objectives	via	SB	375.			
	
6. Planning	Process	Engagement	&	Perceived	Fairness	–	We	anticipate	that	a	local	government	
will	be	more	likely	to	support	regional	GHG	reduction	goals	with	its	local	land	use	policies	
when	it	understands	and	has	engaged	in	the	regional	planning	process	producing	such	goals	
and	when	it	believes	the	MPO	has	clearly	communicated	the	regional	land	use	vision	
(Sabatier	&	Mazmanian,	1980).		
	
Our	study	also	accounts	for	other	factors	that	we	expect	to	influence	the	level	of	local	
government	cooperation	with	the	regional	land	use	plan.		These	include,	for	instance,	local	
government	size	and	growth	rate,	level	of	urbanization,	median	household	income,	and	
predominant	political	party	among	registered	voters.	
	
	
Methodology	
This	study	examines	the	extent	to	which	cities	in	California	are	adopting	local	land	use	
strategies	that	support	the	regional	land	use	visions	intended	to	reduce	automobile	reliance.		
We	ask	this	question	at	a	point	when	the	SB	375	experiment	is	eight-years	old	and	when	the	
California	land	market	has	rebounded	sufficiently	from	the	Great	Recession	to	observe	local	
growth	pressure.		We	assume	that	local	governments	across	the	state	are	responding	
differently	to	the	new	SB	375	planning	framework.		Some	local	governments	will	work	
energetically	to	adopt	plans,	policies,	and	development	decisions	that	support	SB	375	and	MPO	
efforts	to	reduce	automobile-dependent	sprawl.		Such	policies	may	include	increasing	local	
density,	enabling	mixed-use	development,	and	restricting	greenfield	development.		Thus,	we	
also	ask	what	factors	make	local	governments	more	or	less	likely	to	cooperate	with	regional	
land	use	visions.	
	
We	rely	on	a	2017	survey	of	city	and	county	land	use	planning	and	community	development	
directors	in	California	to	study	the	extent	to	which	local	governments	cooperate	with	regional	
land	use	planning	and	the	circumstances	that	drive	such	collaboration.		We	contacted	all	435	
cities	and	all	39	counties	located	within	planning	area	boundaries	of	California’s	18	
Metropolitan	Planning	Organizations	(MPOs),	and	we	invited	the	land	use	planning	and	
development	director	from	each	local	government	to	participate	in	the	survey.		Our	
questionnaire,	administered	online	via	Qualtrix,	collected	information	about	the	land	use	and	
development	practices,	policies,	and	activities	in	each	city	or	county.		We	use	this	information	
to	assess	whether	an	individual	city	or	county	is	taking	steps	to	support	the	regional	land	use	
vision	crafted	by	its	MPO,	the	regional	planning	body	responsible	for	SB	375	in	that	
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metropolitan	area.		Survey	questions	also	examine	the	factors	we	expect	to	influence	whether	a	
city	or	county	is	acting	to	support	that	regional	vision.				
Survey	Instrument	
We	programmed	the	online	survey	using	Qualtrics	survey	software	and	presented	it	on	
university	servers.	Our	survey	contained	various	sets	of	question	designed	to	provide	
information	about	local	governments	and	their	land	use	planning	and	to	serve	as	dependent	
and	independent	variables	in	later	analysis.		Questions	asked	about:	
• local	government	perceptions	of	the	MPO’s	regional	planning	process;		
• local-regional	information	sharing	about	land	use	planning	and	development;		
• local	land	use	practices	and	policies;	
• local	stakeholder	attitudes	toward	land	use	and	development	issues;	
• participation	by	the	local	government	in	available	incentives;	and		
• costs	and	benefits	anticipated	from	implementing	the	regional	land	use	plan.	
	
To	develop	our	survey,	we	collected	and	examined	survey	instruments	used	in	similar	research.		
We	considered	which	question	formats	were	best	suited	to	our	topic	and	desired	analysis	and	
often	modeled	our	own	questions	after	tried-and-tested	formats.		We	also	consulted	with	the	
technical	advisory	committee	(TAC)	serving	this	study.		Many	TAC	members	commented	on	the	
substance	of	questions,	drawing	on	their	expertise	with	local	governments	and	with	California	
land	use	planning,	housing	policies,	and	land	use	data	and	analysis.				
Survey	Recruitment	
California	is	comprised	of	482	cities	and	58	counties.		To	recruit	survey	participants,	we	first	
identified	as	our	target	population	the	local	governments	(474	in	total:	435	cities	and	39	
counties)	located	within	an	MPO	service	area.		Approximately	98%	of	the	state’s	population	
resides	in	these	cities	and	counties	served	by	the	state’s	18	MPOs.		The	remaining	42	cities	and	
19	counties	in	California	do	not	fall	within	an	MPO’s	planning	boundaries	and	are	thus	not	
included	an	MPO’s	regional	land	use	vision	under	SB	375.2			
	
To	invite	survey	participants	from	all	local	jurisdictions	of	interest,	we	drew	from	the	publicly	
available	2016	Directory	of	Planning	Agencies	(DoPA)	developed	by	the	California	Governor’s	
Office	of	Planning	and	Research.		The	Directory	lists	the	most	current	names	and	contact	
information	of	the	planning	department	heads	(or	equivalent)	for	all	cities	and	counties,	as	
collected	from	local	governments	participating	in	the	state’s	most	recent	Annual	Planning	
Survey	(APS).		Of	the	state’s	540	cities	and	counties,	404	(74.8%)	provided	up-to-date	contact	
																																																						
2	Cities	and	counties	outside	of	census-designated	urbanized	areas	are	not	required	to	form	an	MPO	in	their	
region.	Transportation	planning	in	non-MPO	jurisdictions	is	performed	by	rural	Regional	Transportation	Planning	
Agencies.	(See	Figure	A-1-	Caltrans	map	of	MPOs	and	RTPAs).		
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information	for	the	2016	Directory;	for	jurisdictions	that	did	not	provide	such	information	to	
the	APS,	the	Directory	lists	the	most	recent	contact	information	received.			
	
We	used	the	Directory	list	to	email	individual	survey	invitations	to	these	474	city	or	county	
planning	directors.		Where	contact	information	was	obsolete	(we	recorded	17	email	delivery	
failures),	we	replaced	these	email	addresses	via	our	own	information	data	gathering	and	resent	
the	invitation.		We	targeted	the	individual	responsible	for	managing	land	use	planning	and	
policy	development	at	each	jurisdiction;	this	included	people	with	functional	titles	including	
Planning	Director,	Planning	Manager,	Community	Development	Director,	City	or	Town	
Manager,	Principal	Planner,	Senior	Planner,	or	similar	equivalent	titles.		
	
Our	online	survey	opened	in	January	and	closed	in	April	of	2017.		We	emailed	an	initial	survey	
invitation	and	followed	up	with	bi-weekly	email	reminders	sent	through	March	to	any	invited	
cities	or	counties	that	had	not	opened	the	survey	at	all	or	that	had	opened	but	not	finished	it.			
	
In	March,	when	email	reminders	ceased	yielding	additional	survey	responses,	we	began	
telephone	follow	up	to	increase	participation.		We	targeted	our	follow	up	in	two	ways.		First,	we	
worked	to	increase	participation	among	the	cities	and	counties	we	observed	were	under-
represented	in	the	sample	to	date.		These	included	counties	in	general,	major	population	
centers,	and	cities	and	counties	within	certain	metropolitan	areas.		Second,	we	used	the	
answers	already	recorded	for	one	of	our	survey	questions	to	target	specific	cities	and	counties	
of	interest;	we	asked	each	responding	city	or	county	to	identify	up	to	four	jurisdictions	in	their	
region	that	they	viewed	as	important	to	SCS	implementation	in	their	region,	providing	us	with	a	
chain-referral.		Respondents	generally	named	cities	or	counties	that	were	large	in	size,	faced	
significant	growth	pressures,	or	were	regional	leaders.	These	two	approaches	yielded	a	fairly	
consistent	set	of	target	cities	and	counties	for	additional	phone	recruitment;	we	called	
approximately	100	of	these	jurisdictions	in	our	efforts	to	recruit	a	more	representative	sample.		
Survey	Respondents	
Of	the	474	municipalities	invited,	38	percent	(180)	completed	the	survey,	a	response	rate	on	
par	with	similar	studies	(Arnold	&	Neupane,	2016;	Berman	&	Korosec,	2005;	Weible	et	al,	
2017).		We	consider	from	different	angles	the	extent	to	which	our	sample	is	representative	of	
the	larger,	invited	population	of	cities	and	counties	affected	by	SB	375	in	California.			
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Table	1.	Invited	Population	of	Local	Governments	and	Responding	Sample	
	 Small	MPOs	 “Big	Four”	MPOs	 All	MPOs	 TOTAL	
	 Counties	 Cities	 Counties	 Cities	 Counties	 Cities	
Total	(Invited)	 17	 104	 22	 331	 39	 435	 474	
Total	Responding	 6	 41	 16	 117	 22	 158	 180	
Percent	Responding	 35%	 39%	 73%	 35%	 56%	 36%	 38%	
	
	
One	way	to	consider	the	representativeness	of	our	sample	is	to	distinguish	between	cities	and	
counties	within	California’s	largest	and	most	urbanized	metropolitan	planning	organizations	
and	those	within	smaller	MPOs	(Table	1).		The	largest	MPOs,	commonly	called	“The	Big	Four,”	
serve	the	Los	Angeles,	San	Francisco	Bay	Area,	Greater	San	Diego,	and	Sacramento	Area	
regions.		The	lion’s	share	of	the	state’s	land	coverage,	population,	and	cities	and	counties	are	
within	the	boundaries	of	these	MPOs,	respectively,	the	Southern	California	Association	of	
Governments	(SCAG),	San	Francisco	Bay	Area	Metropolitan	Transportation	Commission	(MTC),	
San	Diego	Association	of	Governments	(SANDAG),	and	Sacramento	Area	Council	of	
Governments	(SACOG).		(See	appendix	Table	A-1	and	Figure	A-1.)		
	
Table	2	reports	the	descriptive	statistics	for	the	cities	and	counties	responding	to	our	survey	
and	suggests	that	the	sample	reflects	local	governments	within	the	metropolitan	region	and	the	
wider	state.	Descriptive	results	reported	in	Table	3	suggest	that	the	California	cities	in	the	
sample	had	adopted	on	average	about	five	of	the	eight	key	land	use	strategies	asked	about	in	
the	survey.		About	15	cities—including	Woodland,	Chico,	Sacramento,	Montclair,	and	Santa	
Cruz—reported	using	all	eight	strategies,	while	two	cities—Beverly	Hills	and	Norwalk—reported	
using	none.		Cities	in	our	sample	generally	have	a	higher	proportion	of	registered	Democrats	
than	other	political	groups,	with	the	highest	proportions	of	Democrats	in	cities	in	Bay	area	like	
San	Francisco,	Oakland,	and	Berkeley,	and	in	counties	such	as	Marin,	Sonoma,	and	in	southern	
California,	Los	Angeles.		Fewer	shares	of	Democratic-registered	voters	are	found	in	cities	
located	more	rural	counties	such	as	El	Dorado,	Yuba,	Placer,	and	Shasta	Counties.		San	Diego	
was	the	largest	city	in	our	survey,	with	a	population	of	nearly	1.4	million,	followed	by	
Sacramento,	Long	Beach,	and	Oakland;	the	ten	smallest	cities,	including	Avalon,	Bradbury	and	
Calistoga,	had	populations	between	roughly	1,000	and	5,000	people.		The	size	of	sample	cities’	
planning	staff	varied	correspondingly,	from	1	staff	person	to	110.			
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Table	2.	Sample	of	Cities	and	Counties	Responding	to	Survey	
	 City	 County	
	 Sample	
Avg.	
Population	
Avg.	
Sample			
Avg.	
Population	
Avg.	
	 (n	=	157)	 (N	=	435)	 (n	=	22)	 (N	=	38)	
Total	Population	(Cities	–	2016;	Counties	-	2010)	 88,601	 74,259	 1,317,306	 958,155	
	 	 	 	 	
Urban	Population	Percentage	(2010)	 98.18	 97.46	 90.74	 86.86	
	 	 	 	 	
Population	Growth	%	(Cities	2008-16;	Counties	2000-10)	 6.90	 6.67	 12.72	 12.97	
	 	 	 	 	
Urban	Population	Growth	%	(2000-10)	 0.20	 0.57	 -0.73	 -1.15	
	 	 	 	 	
Median	Household	Income	(2010)	 67,715	 69,298	 62,234	 60,417	
	 	 	 	 	
Number	(%)	of	Charter	Cities	 46	(28%)	 121	(27%)	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Democrat	Registration	%	(2016)	 44.58	 43.94	 44.71	 42.57	
Republican/Libertarian	Registration	%	(2016)	 28.68	 29.14	 2.71	 2.74	
Independent	Registration%	(2016)	 2.60	 2.59	 0.50	 0.51	
Green	Party	Registration	%	(2016)		 0.42	 0.41	 0.50	 0.51	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Table	3.	Sample	Cities	and	Descriptive	Statistics	
Variable	 Mean	 SD	 Min	 Max	
Number	of	Sustainable	Land	Practices	(DV)	(Q7)	 5.27	 1.85	 0.00	 8.00	
Democrat	Registration	%	2016	 44.58	 12.19	 21.72	 70.24	
Republican	+	Libertarian	Registration	%	2016	 28.68	 12.43	 3.85	 56.06	
Green	Party	Registration	%	2016	 0.42	 0.29	 0	 1.87	
sqrt(	Green	Party	Registration	%	2016	)		 0.62	 0.20	 0	 1.37	
Population	2016	 88,600.97	 150,673.00	 1,123.00	 1,391,676.00	
log(	Population	2016	)	 10.64	 1.27	 7.02	 14.15	
Urban	Population	%	2010	 98.18	 9.36	 0	 100.00	
Median	Household	Income	2010	 67,714.96	 28,102.65	 25,216.00	 219,485.00	
log(	Median	Household	Income	2010	)	 11.06	 0.34	 10.14	 12.30	
Population	Growth	%	08-16	 6.90	 5.68	 -9.58	 27.32	
Urban	Population	Growth	%	00-10	 0.20	 8.85	 -41.24	 98.58	
Planning	Staff	Capacity	 6.69	 11.73	 1.00	 110.00	
log(	Planning	Staff	Capacity)	 1.34	 0.95	 0	 4.70	
Prior	Collaboration	(Q17Composite)		 2.59	 0.74	 1.00	 4.43	
Planning	Awareness	&	Engagement		
(Q5,6	FB	Comp,	Group	1)	
3.83	 0.67	 1.00	 5.00	
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Variable	 Mean	 SD	 Min	 Max	
Regional	Planning	Confidence	
(Q5,6	FB	Comp,	Group	2)	
3.13	 0.71	 1.00	 5.00	
Regional	Planning	Decisions	-	Satisfaction	
(Q5,6	FB	Comp,	Group	3)	
3.04	 0.78	 1.00	 5.00	
Anticipated	Benefits	of	Plan	Implementation	
(Q19Composite)	
3.19	 0.39	 2.14	 4.43	
Sustainable	Growth	Consensus	
(Q12	FB	Comp,1,3,6)	
3.39	 0.75	 1.00	 5.00	
	
	
Key	Survey	Results	
We	report	several	key	descriptive	results	from	our	survey	in	this	section,	and	we	note	that	the	
report	appendix	reports	a	more	comprehensive	set	of	survey	responses	in	a	series	of	tables.	
Local	Adoption	of	Smart	Growth	Zoning	
Our	survey	asked	local	governments	to	indicate	whether	its	current	zoning	code	provides	for	
eight	different	strategies	associated	with	concentrating	physical	development	in	order	to	
increase	accessibility	and	reduce	automobile	reliance.		We	ask	if	the	jurisdiction’s	zoning	
provides	for	(1)	increased	building	densities	and	(2)	increased	heights;	development	that	is	(3)	
infill,	(4)	mixed-use,	or	(5)	transit-oriented;	(6)	reduced	or	eliminated	minimum	parking	
requirements;	(7)	an	urban	growth	boundary;	and	(8)	ag-land	or	open	space	preservation.		
Results	show	that	cities	do	not	adopt	these	strategies	evenly.	(See	Table	4	and	Figure	1.)					
	
Table	4.	Adoption	of	Smart	Growth	Strategies	in	City	and	County	Zoning	Codes	
	 Total	 	 City	 	 County	
	 No	 Yes	 n	 	 No	 Yes	 n	 	 No	 Yes	 n	
Increased	Building	Densities	(Q7.1)	 16.4	 83.6	 177	 	 16.1	 83.9	 155	 	 18.2	 81.8	 22	
Increased	Building	Heights	(Q7.2)	 43.7	 56.3	 174	 	 44.7	 55.3	 152	 	 36.4	 63.6	 22	
Infill	Development	(Q7.3)	 9.6	 90.4	 177	 	 9.7	 90.3	 155	 	 9.1	 90.9	 22	
Urban	Growth	Boundary	(Q7.4)	 64.7	 35.3	 173	 	 68.2	 31.8	 151	 	 40.9	 59.1	 22	
Mixed-Use	Development	(Q7.5)	 8.5	 91.5	 176	 	 9.1	 90.9	 154	 	 4.5	 95.5	 22	
Transit-Oriented	Development	(Q7.6)	 42.4	 57.6	 172	 	 44.0	 56.0	 150	 	 31.8	 68.2	 22	
Reduce/Eliminate	Min.	Parking	Requirements	(Q7.7)	 41.6	 58.4	 173	 	 43.0	 57.0	 151	 	 31.8	 68.2	 22	
Agricultural	/	Open	Space	Land	Preservation	(Q7.8)	 26.7	 73.3	 176	 	 29.9	 70.1	 154	 	 4.5	 95.5	 22	
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Figure	1.	Sustainably-oriented	Land	Use	Strategies	in	California	
	
	
Awareness	and	Pursuit	of	External	Grants	to	Support	SCS	Implementation	
Cities	and	counties	in	California	may	try	for	a	variety	of	federal,	state,	and	regional	government	
and	non-profit	foundation	grants	that	support	the	smart	growth-oriented	planning	and	land	use	
that	SB	375	anticipates.		Several	such	state-funded	programs,	for	instance	the	Affordable	
Housing	and	Sustainable	Communities	Program,	explicitly	emphasize	implementation	of	
regional	Sustainable	Communities	Strategies	in	their	objectives	and	award	criteria.			
	
We	ask	about	eight	such	opportunities,	listed	in	Table	5a,	and	construct	a	composite	metric	for	
each	local	jurisdiction.		We	award	points	as	indicated	in	Table	5b,	based	on	the	extent	to	which	
each	jurisdiction	is	aware	of	or	has	taken	steps	to	secure	such	funding	to	develop	plans	or	
projects	implementing	the	regional	plan/SCS.		Focusing	on	“awareness	of	grant	opportunities,”	
we	found	that	of	our	sample	of	157	cities,	the	highest	score	was	21	points	and	the	lowest	was	0	
points.	A	histogram	of	this	composite	“awareness	score”	(see	Figure	2)	shows	there	is	an	
approximately	normal	distribution	centered	around	nine	or	ten,	but	a	noticeably	high	number	
of	respondents	(18)	scored	zero,	as	they	responded	“not	aware”	for	all	eight	questions.		
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Table	5a.	Grant	Opportunities	for	SCS	Implementation	
1. Affordable	Housing	and	Sustainable	Communities	
2. State	Active	Transportation	Program	
3. Caltrans	Sustainable	Transportation	Planning	Grant	Programs	
4. MPO’s	Regional	Active	Transportation	Program	
5. Other	MPO	incentive	grant	programs	
6. Any	Federal	grant	opportunities	
7. Foundation	or	Non-Profit	grant	programs		
8. Any	other	grants	not	listed	
	
	
Table	5b.	Points	Earned	for	Awareness	and	Pursuit	of	Grants	
0	=	Not	aware	of	grant	
1	=	Aware	of	grant.	Did	not	apply.	
1	=	Aware	of	grant.		Grant	not	applicable	to	jurisdiction.		
2	=	Applied	for	grant.	Not	awarded	funding.	
3	=	Applied	for	grant.	Awarded	funding.	
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	 Total	score	for	grant	awareness,	application,	and	funding	awards.	
	
Figure	2.	Distribution	of	Total	Grant	Scores	among	Cities	(Higher	scores	signify	city	is	aware	of	
more	SCS	implementation-grant	opportunities,	city	applied	for	more	grants,	and	city	was	
awarded	more	such	grants	than	others.)		
	
	
We	explore	the	high	number	of	cities	that	are	unaware	of	such	grants	by	comparing	the	sub-
sample	of	18	cities	with	the	overall	survey	respondent	sample	of	157	cities.	Z-Tests	on	the	
demographic	statistics	and	other	survey	question	responses	found	no	statistically	significant	
differences	between	the	sub-sample	and	survey	respondent	sample.	In	other	words,	
differences	in	cities’	demographic	statistics	(median	household	income,	city	population,	city	
population	growth,	political	party	registration,	and	urban	population	percentage)	and	in	the	
responding	planning	managers	(the	number	of	years	the	respondent	has	worked	at	the	local	
jurisdiction,	their	experience	in	planning)	and	other	information	drawn	from	the	survey	could	
not	explain	this	difference.			
	
We	summarize	other	key	findings	from	the	survey	in	bullets	below,	and	refer	interested	readers	
to	the	appropriate	summary	table(s).		
• For	one,	a	majority	of	both	county	and	city	planning	managers	report	that	SB	375	had	little	
to	no	impact	on	actions	by	their	city	to	adopt	or	strengthen	the	eight	smart	growth	
strategies	asked	about	in	the	survey.		Responses	to	this	effect	were	especially	pronounced	
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for	the	use	of	urban	growth	boundaries	and	of	ag-land	and	open	space	preservation,	
suggesting	that	cities	may	have	been	motivated	to	support	such	strategies	for	other	
reasons,	perhaps	even	before	SB	375.		(Table	A-3).	
• At	the	same	time,	a	majority	of	cities	and	counties	report	that	SB	375	has	led	to	increased	
communication	among	local	governments	and	other	actors	about	land	use	issues	and	has	
led	them	to	participate	more	in	the	regional	planning	process	(Table	A-11).	
• When	asked	about	the	eight	smart	growth	land	use	strategies,	relatively	few	local	
governments	anticipate	that	SB	375	will	have	a	substantial	impact	on	their	cities	in	terms	of	
specific	costs	or	benefits	(Table	A-4).	
• A	majority	of	local	governments	report	that	they	participated	in	the	RTP/SCS	process	and	
that	the	MPO	gave	their	input	reasonable	consideration	(Table	A-5).	
• Local	government	responses	suggest	that	information	costs	are	not	a	notable	deterrent	to	
collaboration	on	SB	375.		Nearly	two-thirds	to	almost	90%	of	MPOs	report	sharing	various	
forms	of	local	land	use	information	with	their	MPO	(Table	A-7).		Also,	a	majority	of	cities	
and	counties	alike	report	it	is	easy	to	learn	about	the	development	decisions	of	neighboring	
local	governments	(Table	A-8).	
• At	the	same	time,	many	local	governments	anticipate	defection	from	neighboring	local	
governments,	i.e.	that	neighboring	jurisdictions	will	ignore	the	RTP/SCS	when	making	
development	decisions	(Table	A-5,	Q5.8).	
• Only	about	one-fifth	of	responding	local	governments	report	no	experience	at	all	
collaborating	with	other	jurisdictions	on	various	issues	asked	about	in	the	survey.		The	
majority	of	cities	and	counties	alike	report	some	experience	with	collaboration,	but	very	
few	say	they	collaborate	a	great	deal	with	other	jurisdictions	or	stakeholders	(Table	A-9).	
• Roughly	one-quarter	to	one-third	of	local	governments	are	not	aware	of	the	various	state	
and	regional	grant	programs	available	to	support	implementation	of	the	SCS	(Table	A-10).		
Somewhat	similar	shares	report,	in	contrast,	having	been	awarded	funds	from	these	
programs.	
	
	
Measurement	
Dependent	Variables	
We	seek	to	explain	what	factors	lead	an	individual	city	or	county	to	support	the	MPO’s	regional	
land	use	vision,	crafted	to	fulfill	SB	375	requirements,	by	adopting	local	land	use	policies	and	
development	practices	that	would	help	implement	that	vision.		We	thus	examine	local	
government	adoption	of	land	use	strategies	to	concentrate	development	in	existing	activity	
centers.		Such	practices	promote	development	patterns	that	have	been	shown	to	attenuate	the	
frequency	and	distance	(vehicle	miles	traveled	or	VMT)	of	vehicle	trips	needed	to	accomplish	
daily	activities	and	to	increase	the	trips	made	by	cycling,	walking,	or	public	transportation.			
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We	use	these	results	to	create	a	count-based	dependent	variable	tallying	the	number	of	
supportive	land	use	strategies	employed	by	each	jurisdiction.		To	test	whether	grouping	these	
eight	items	provides	a	reliable	measure	for	the	concept	of	regionally	supportive	land	use	
measures,	we	compute	Cronbach’s	alpha	for	the	eight	items.		The	score,	0.64,	indicates	that	our	
survey	items	hang	together	fairly	well	and	provide	a	relatively	cohesive,	unidimensional	
dependent	variable.		We	also	considered--but	ultimately	rejected--a	more	limited	version	of	the	
dependent	variable,	including	only	five	of	the	eight	items.		(We	wondered	if	a	more	limited	
version,	though	not	warranted	by	the	Cronbach’s	alpha	results,	might	provide	a	more	robust	
measure	of	regionally	supportive	land	use	strategies	by	excluding	from	the	count	three	
strategies	we	judged	as	less	applicable	across	all	jurisdictions.		We	reasoned	that	a	city	already	
land-locked	would	not	enact	an	urban	growth	boundary;	that	transit-oriented	development	is	
irrelevant	where	no	transit	system	exists;	and	that	some	cities	have	no	agricultural	or	natural	
lands	to	preserve.		Ultimately,	however,	we	concluded	this	5-item	composite	measure	ranging	
from	zero	to	five	bordered	on	problematic	for	a	Poisson	model,	was	not	more	advantageous	
than	and	negligibly	improved	model	fit	over	the	8-item	measure.)		The	8-item	measure	of	
regionally	supportive	land	use	also	satisfied	the	Poisson	mean	variance	assumptions	more	
closely	to	and	was	more	equidispersed	(Mean:	5.27,	Variance:	3.44).		
	
The	count-based	nature	of	our	dependent	variable	will	lead	us	to	a	Poisson	model	to	examine	
local	support	for	the	regional	land	use	vision.		The	distribution	of	our	dependent	variable	does	
not	follow	the	typical	skewed	Poisson	distribution,	as	the	mean	number	of	strategies	employed	
by	jurisdictions	is	4,	not	particularly	small.		The	dependent	variable,	however,	is	not	
overdispersed,	meeting	a	critical	Poisson	assumption.		We	conclude	that	a	Poisson	model	is	
likely	to	provide	reliable	estimators	for	our	independent	variables.			
	
We	examine	but	ultimately	reject	operationalizing	the	concept	of	local	land	use	and	
development	practices	in	a	second	way.	This	second	approach	scores	each	jurisdiction’s	level	of	
effort	to	win	discretionary	grants	to	pay	for	local	plans	and	projects	that	would	implement	the	
RTP/SCS;	the	approach	would,	we	thought,	complement	measures	of	local	adoption	of	
regionally	supportive	land	use	strategies.		With	18	of	157	cities	unaware	of	all	eight	grant	
options,	this	second	version	of	the	dependent	variable	was	starkly	bimodal	and	did	not	lend	
itself	to	being	modeled.	
	
Independent	Variables	
To	explain	the	extent	to	which	local	governments	adopt	regionally	supportive	land	use	
strategies,	we	turn	to	several	independent	variables	developed	from	our	primary	survey	data	
and	a	set	of	control	variables	drawn	from	existing	secondary	data	sources.	
	
The	literature	on	institutional	collective	action	problems	and	collaborative	governance	leads	us	
to	expect	that	a	local	jurisdiction	will	adopt	more	land	use	strategies	supporting	regional	smart-
growth	the	more	it	is	aware	of	and	has	engaged	in	the	regional	planning	process	that	produced	
such	strategies.	In	particular,	we	expect	local	governments	will	do	more	to	support	regional	
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smart	growth	that	the	more	confidence	it	has	in	the	underlying	fairness	of	regional	planning	
and	the	willingness	of	its	neighboring	jurisdictions	to	abide	by	plan	policies.		Further,	we	expect	
a	local	jurisdiction	will	adopt	more	smart	growth	strategies	the	more	that	jurisdiction	
anticipates	it	will	accrue	benefits	from	implementation	of	regional	smart	growth	and	the	more	
the	jurisdiction	has	collaborated	previously	with	other	local	governments	on	shared	problems.		
We	draw	on	three	batteries	of	survey	questions	to	develop	measures	for	these	factors	as	
independent	variables.	
	
Planning	awareness,	engagement	and	perceptions		
First,	to	measure	how	local	governments	perceive,	experience,	and	engage	in	the	regional	
planning	process	and	the	most	recently	adopted	plan,	we	rely	on	Likert-scaled	responses	to	a	
set	of	eight	statements	about	the	regional	planning	process	and	adopted	RTP/SCS	plan.		The	
items	assess	the	degree	to	which	a	city	or	county	(1)	understands	and	(2)	used	opportunities	to	
participate	in	the	planning	process;	believes	the	MPO	(3)	took	its	input	seriously	during	plan	
development	and	(4)	makes	fair	decisions;	(5)	believes	its	engagement	in	plan	development	had	
an	impact;	(6)	understands	the	priority-growth	locations	outlined	by	the	MPO;	thinks	(7)	
expectations	for	its	own	development	and	(8)	for	development	in	neighboring	jurisdictions	are	
consistent	with	the	adopted	regional	plan/SCS.			
	
We	create	a	composite	variable	(Positive	planning	perception,	awareness,	and	engagement)	
from	these	items	and	compute	Cronbach’s	alpha	(0.69),	which	suggests	that	they	provide	an	
internally	reliable	general	measure	of	positive	awareness,	perceptions,	and	engagement	with	
regional	planning.		We	also	perform	factor	analysis	on	these	and	related	survey	questions	(Q6)	
to	tease	out	more	specific	city	perceptions	and	behaviors	with	respect	to	regional	planning;	we	
create	three	composites	variables,	guided	by	the	resulting	factor	groupings:	Planning	
awareness	&	engagement,	Confidence	in	regional	planning,	and	Satisfaction	with	regional	
planning	decisions.								
	
Anticipated	benefits	
Second,	we	use	responses	to	a	set	of	14	statements	about	the	potential	impacts	of	smart	
growth	to	measure	the	extent	to	which	a	jurisdiction	believes	that	it	would	benefit	from	
RTP/SCS	implementation	or	not.	Cities	responded	on	a	5-point	scale	that	plan	implementation	
would	have	“no	impact”	to	“substantial	impacts”	on	their	jurisdictions,	considering	various	
favorable	outcomes,	such	as	reducing	air	pollution,	preserving	open	space,	attracting	jobs,	and	
improving	transportation	and	housing	choices.		Cities	also	reported	the	extent	of	anticipated	
negative	impacts	from	plan	implementation,	such	as	increased	housing	prices,	displacement	of	
vulnerable	populations,	lost	economic	development,	and	increased	congestion.		We	recode	
responses	to	ease	interpretation	in	a	single	direction,	positive	impacts,	and	we	create	a	
composite	independent	variable	and	its	Cronbach’s	alpha	(0.62),	confirming	its	usefulness	as	a	
fairly	reliable	if	not	perfect	measure	of	whether	local	governments	anticipate	more	benefits	
than	costs	from	regional	plan	implementation.			
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Sustainable	growth	and	development	consensus	
The	positions	of	a	jurisdiction’s	stakeholders—including	its	neighborhood,	business,	and	
environmental	groups;	its	real	estate	developers;	and	its	elected	officials	and	planning	staff—
may	increase	or	decrease	the	extent	to	which	that	jurisdiction	adopts	smart	growth	land	use	
strategies.		We	ask	survey	respondents	to	report	the	level	of	consensus	among	local	
stakeholders	around	statements	such	as	“climate	change	is	occurring	due	to	human	activity;”	
“more	dense	development	is	needed;”	and	“land	use	decision	should	support	walking	cycling	
and	transit.”		We	also	ask	about	consensus	around	statements	suggesting	that	development	is	
needed	for	tax	revenue;	that	land	use	regulations	are	too	restrictive;	and	that	infill	
development	would	threaten	community	character.		Factor	analysis	of	this	question	battery	
yields	a	variable	measuring	Sustainable	growth	consensus,	indicating	agreement	on	
anthropogenic	climate	change	and	support	for	alternative	transportation	and	for	denser	
development	unite	cities.		We	anticipate	that	cities	with	higher	levels	of	local	consensus	around	
sustainable	growth	and	development	will	adopt	more	smart	growth	land	use	approaches.			
	
Controls	
We	seek	to	account	for	other	potentially	important	determinants	of	regionally	supportive	local	
land	use	policies	that	are	not	represented	in	our	theoretically-driven	independent	variables.		
We	add	control	variables	representing	factors	that	we	reason	stand	to	shape	local	land	use	
policy	outcomes	and	that	similar	studies	have	identified	as	influential	in	determining	similar	
outcomes.		Our	control	variables	include	a	jurisdiction’s	population	size	and	growth	rate	(from	
the	U.S.	Census),	to	account	for	the	pressures	that	fast	population	growth	may	create	for	land	
use	policies	and	decisions	that	are	not	restrictive	and	that	accommodate	growth,	whether	or	
not	it	reflects	the	regional	smart	growth	vision	in	the	RTP/SCS.		We	also	control	for	median	
household	income	in	the	jurisdiction,	as	we	anticipate	that	higher	levels	of	community	wealth	
may	decrease	receptiveness	to	land	use	strategies	that	would	increase	density	(Brody,	et	al,	
2006).		Residents’	attitudes	about	property	rights	are	likely	to	be	influential,	and	hence	we	
include	the	percent	of	registered	voters	identified	as	Republican	or	Libertarian,	Democrat,	or	
Green	party	members,	drawing	from	data	published	by	the	California	Secretary	of	State.		We	
expect	that	cities	will	adopt	fewer	smart	growth	strategies	when	they	have	high	shares	of	
registered	voters	in	the	Republican	or	Libertarian	party.	
			
We	also	identify	cities	that	have	their	own	city	charter,	which	we	view	as	indicating	a	city’s	
inclination	toward	self-determination.		California’s	state	constitution	allows	cities	to	adopt	their	
own	governing	charters,	identifying	structural	features	of	their	local	governments	from	city	
council	size,	to	election	cycle,	to	election	types	(at-large	or	district-based),	to	contracting	
requirements	(Stone	&	Tucker,	2016);	roughly	one-quarter	of	California	cities	are	“Charter	
Cities,”	according	to	the	League	of	California	Cities	(2011).		We	anticipate	that	a	city	that	has	
elected	structural	home	rule	could	be	averse	to	adopting	regionally	oriented	land	use	
strategies.			
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Finally,	we	control	for	the	number	of	full-time	planning	staff	employed	in	each	jurisdiction,	as	
recorded	by	the	in	the	California	Office	of	Planning	and	Research	(Annual	Planning	Survey,	
2016).		We	expect	that	higher	levels	of	staff	capacity	will	enable	local	governments	to	
undertake	planning	activities	that	would	lead	to	adoption	of	smart	growth	strategies,	for	
instance	by	having	more	staff	resources	to	update	the	General	Plan	to	reflect	SB	375	objectives	
or	by	communicating	with	the	MPO	about	the	regional	smart	growth	vision.			
	
Descriptive	Results	of	Model	Variables	
We	used	survey	responses	to	develop	a	number	of	independent	variables	characterizing	local	
government	experiences	with	regional	land	use	planning	under	the	SCS	development	process.		
In	general,	responding	cities	firmly	agreed	that	they	understood	and	used	the	avenues	available	
to	participate	in	development	of	the	SCS.		They	also	expressed	reasonable	confidence	in	the	
fairness	of	the	regional	planning	process,	though	somewhat	less	satisfaction	with	regional	
planning	decisions.		On	average,	responding	cities	exhibited	more	uniform	agreement	that	
implementation	of	the	RTP/SCS	would	benefit	them	more	than	not.		Moreover,	when	asked	
about	local	stakeholder	consensus	on	sustainability	issues,	cities	in	the	sample	on	average	
indicated	there	was	slightly	more	support	for	than	opposition	to	cycling-	and	walking-friendly	
land	use	decisions	and	density,	and	for	acknowledgment	that	human	activities	are	contributing	
to	climate	change.	
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Table	6.	Local	Adoption	of	Regionally	Supportive	Land	Use	Strategies	
	
	
	
Independent	Variable	 Local	Controls	
Local	
Government	
Capacity	
Regional	
Planning	&	
Collaboration	
Experiences	
Local	Interests	/	
Pressures	
Regional	
Planning	
Participation	
(Composite	
Measure)	
Regional	
Planning	
(Composite)	
+	
Collaboration	
Experiences	
Regional	
Planning	
(Comp)	+	
Planning	Staff	
Capacity		
Planning	
Staff	
Capacity	+	
Collaboration	
Experiences	
Democrat	Registration	%	2016	 0.003	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 (0.011)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Republican	+	Libertarian	Registration	%	2016	 0.004	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 (0.011)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
sqrt(	Green	Party	Registration	%	2016	)		 0.468**	 	 	 	 0.313*	 0.336*	 0.645***	 0.733***	
	 (0.196)	 	 	 	 (0.179)	 (0.179)	 (0.223)	 (0.219)	
log(	Population	2016	)	 0.010***	 	 	 	 0.103***	 0.095***	 0.237***	 0.236***	
	 (0.031)	 	 	 	 (0.029)	 (0.029)	 (0.057)	 (0.056)	
Urban	Population	%	2010	 -0.002	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 (0.004)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
log(	Median	Household	Income	2010	)	 -0.230**	 	 	 	 -0.191*	 -0.248**	 	 	
	 (0.116)	 	 	 	 (0.111)	 (0.113)	 	 	
Population	Growth	%	08-16	 0.007	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 (0.007)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Urban	Population	Growth	%	00-10	 -0.004	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 (0.005)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
log(	Planning	Staff	Capacity	)	 	 0.077*	 	 	 	 	 -0.190***	 -0.204***	
	 	 (0.041)	 	 	 	 	 (0.073)	 (0.073)	
Prior	Collaboration	(Q17Composite)	 	 	 0.089**	 	 	 0.089*	 	 0.091*	
	 	 	 (0.045)	 	 	 (0.050)	 	 (0.054)	
Planning	awareness	&	engagement		 	 	 0.068	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 (0.054)	 	 	 	 	 	
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Table	6.	Continued	
Independent	Variable	 Local	Controls	
Local	
Government	
Capacity	
Regional	
Planning	&	
Collaboration	
Experiences	
Local	Interests	/	
Pressures	
Regional	
Planning	
Participation	
(Composite	
Measure)	
Regional	
Planning	
(Composite)	+	
Collaboration	
Experiences	
Regional	
Planning	
(Composite)	+	
Planning	Staff	
Capacity	+		
Planning	Staff	
Capacity	+	
Collaboration	
Experiences	
Confidence	in	regional	planning	 	 	 0.088	 	 	 	 	 	
Group	2:	5.4,	5.6,	5.7,	5.8	 	 	 (0.053)	 	 	 	 	 	
Satisfaction	with	regional	planning	decisions	 	 	 -0.002	 	 	 	 	 	
Group	3:	5.6,	6.1,	6.2	 	 	 (0.050)	 	 	 	 	 	
Pos.	Planning	Perception,	Engagement,	
Awareness	 	 	 	 0.167**	 0.133*	 	 0.161*	 	
Q5	Composite	 	 	 	 (0.069)	 (0.070)	 	 (0.084)	 	
Anticipated	Benefits	(Q19Composite)	 	 	 	 0.003	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.091)	 	 	 	 	
Charter	City	 	 	 	 0.065	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.074)	 	 	 	 	
Sustainable	growth	consensus	(Q12	
Composite)	 	 	 	 0.069	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.047)	 	 	 	 	
Intercept	 2.731	 1.546***	 0.928***	 0.844***	 2.017	 2.942**	 -1.596**	 -1.302**	
	 (1.756)	 (0.070)	 (0.254)	 (0.301)	 (1.322)	 (1.299)	 (0.644)	 (0.607)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
N	 155	 122	 145	 147	 151	 153	 118	 121	
DV	=	Question	7	Composite,	Model	=	Poisson	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
AIC	 645.43	 515.56	 675.06	 694.24	 608.47	 628.98	 466.95	 491.92	
*p	<	0.10;	**p	<	0.05;***p	<	0.01	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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Model	Results	
Table	6	reports	the	several	preliminary	models	tested	to	explain	the	adoption	of	regionally	
supportive	land	use	strategies	by	local	governments	in	California.		The	dependent	variable	in	
each	regression	is	the	count	of	smart-growth	supportive	land	use	strategies	employed	by	each	
jurisdiction,	as	reported	in	the	survey.		The	count-based	nature	of	the	dependent	variable	
(ranging	from	0	to	8	strategies)	leads	us	to	use	a	Poisson	model	for	the	regression	estimates.		
Our	follow-on	research	is	currently	exploring	additional	model	specifications,	and	the	results	
discussed	here	represent	a	starting	point.									
	
We	work	first	to	understand	the	influence	of	local	factors	such	as	political	affiliation	among	
registered	voters,	city	population	size	and	growth	rate,	and	median	household	income.		
Increases	in	household	income	and	city	population	both	increase	the	number	of	strategies	a	
city	adopts	to	implement	smart	growth	land	use.		However,	local	political	affiliation	makes	a	
statistically	significant	positive	difference	in	such	strategy	adoption	only	for	Green	Party	
registered	voters.		Tested	alone,	the	number	of	planning	staff	employed	by	a	city	has	a	positive	
effect	on	smart	growth	strategy	adoption,	though	at	a	0.10	significance	level.			
	
We	next	examine	the	effect	of	local	governments’	prior	experience	collaboration	with	other	
jurisdictions	and	its	experience	with	regional	planning	for	transportation,	land	use	and	housing	
under	SB	375	requirements	for	development	of	the	SCS.		Only	a	city’s	prior	experiences	with	
inter-municipal	collaboration	on	such	issues	as	water,	sanitation,	and	workforce	development	
appear	to	exert	a	significantly	positive	influence	on	its	use	of	smart	growth	land	use	strategies.		
Awareness	of	and	engagement	in	the	RTP/SCS	planning	process,	confidence	in	the	fairness	of	
planning	decisions,	and	satisfaction	with	planning	decisions	do	not	seem	to	have	a	measurable	
impact	on	local	government’s	adoption	of	RTP/SCS	implementing	policies.	
	
We	test	for	the	impact	of	attitudes	toward	and	engagement	in	regional	planning	more	generally	
in	a	“local	interests	and	pressures”	model	using	a	composite	variable	that	combines	a	city’s	
responses	across	all	RTP/SCS	planning	process	related	questions,	rather	than	separately	
measuring	the	impact	of	planning	awareness,	confidence,	and	satisfaction.		The	composite	
variable	captures	positive	perceptions	of	and	involvement	with	regional	planning	very	broadly,	
and	has	a	significant	influence	measured	in	this	more	encompassing	way.		To	our	surprise,	
anticipation	that	a	city	will	derive	benefits	from	implementation	of	the	regional	land	use	plan	
plays	no	role	in	its	adoption	of	implementation-supporting	strategies.		Nor	does	a	city’s	identity	
as	a	“Charter	City,”	or	local	consensus	among	city	stakeholders	supporting	sustainable	growth	
and	development.				
	
We	examine	several	additional	models	using	our	composite	measure	of	Regional	Planning	
Participation	together	with	other	significant	determinants	of	a	city’s	adoption	of	smart	growth	
land	use	strategies.		We	compute	Akaike’s	Information	Criterion	(AIC),	with	an	eye	toward	
models	that	yield	a	lower	AIC	score,	signaling	relatively	higher	model	quality.		The	presence	of	
Green	Party	registered	voters—albeit	typically	very	small—retains	a	consistently	positive	and	
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significant	effect	on	adoption	of	local	smart	growth	strategies.		Population	size	too	has	a	
consistently	positive	and	significant	influence.		Ultimately,	however,	the	effect	of	a	city’s	
wealth,	measured	in	median	household	income,	fades	once	planning	staff	capacity	is	accounted	
for.		Indeed,	prior	collaborative	experiences	and	positive	perceptions	of	participation	in	regional	
planning	also	matter	far	less	in	the	end	than	does	planning	staff	capacity.		These	results	
suggest,	counterintuitively,	that	numbers	of	planning	staff	may	be	linked	to	decreased	
implementation	of	smart	growth-oriented	planning,	all	else	held	equal.		In	next	steps,	we	will	
use	different	dependent	variable	constructions	and	model	building	approaches	to	explore	this	
unexpected	result.	
	
	
Concluding	Observations	
The	survey	study	undertaken	attempted	to	quantify	whether	and	to	what	extent	local	
governments	are	supporting	SB	375	implementation	with	their	land	use	and	development	
decisions.		Our	survey	studied	two	main	outcomes.		We	asked	cities	and	counties	about	the	
inclusion	of	eight	different	strategies	–	associated	with	more	accessible	development	patterns	–	
in	their	zoning	codes.		We	also	asked	about	their	awareness	of	and	experiences	with	a	variety	of	
state,	regional,	federal	and	other	grants	available	for	supporting	SB	375	/	SCS-compatible	
implementation	activities.			
	
Overall,	we	found	that	cities	do	not	uniformly	include	in	their	zoning	codes	land	use	strategies	
to	promote	smart	growth.		On	average	cities	use	about	five	of	eight	of	the	strategies,	and	
policies	to	increase	mixed	use,	infill	development,	and	building	density	appear	most	common.		
Further,	while	we	anticipated	a	range	of	local	government	characteristics	and	factors	would	
play	a	role	in	how	extensively	a	city	adopts	favorable	strategies,	our	preliminary	models	suggest	
that	only	a	few	did,	notably	positive	awareness	of,	engagement	in,	and	perceptions	of	planning;	
population	size;	and	Green-party	voters.		The	effect	of	planning	staff	capacity	works	in	the	
negative	direction.			
	
This	work	and	what	it	reveals	about	local	government	experiences	with	SB	375	implementation	
suggests	various	implications	for	practice	and	for	future	study	and	monitoring	of	SB	375	
implementation.			
• On	the	whole,	California	cities	and	counties	anticipate	similar	costs	and	benefits	to	their	
jurisdictions	from	implementation	of	the	RTP/SCS,	and	these	do	not	appear	to	have	a	
measurable	impact	on	a	local	government’s	willingness	to	adopt	smart	growth	land	use	
strategies	or	not.		
• Few	California	cities	and	counties	attribute	any	adoption	or	strengthening	of	the	eight	smart	
growth	strategies	in	their	zoning	to	SB	375.		At	best,	they	perceive	SB	375	as	having	only	
modest	influence	on	their	city’s	choices	in	this	regard.		We	interpret	this	result	as	reflecting	
the	law’s	voluntary	framework	and	indicating	that	SB	375	may	be	working	effectively	behind	
the	scenes.	
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• Exploratory	modeling,	discussed	in	the	report	appendix,	suggests	that	certain	factors	may	
increase	the	number	of	smart	growth	strategies	that	a	local	government	is	likely	to	report	
including	in	its	zoning	code.		These	factors	include	positive	awareness	of,	engagement	in,	
and	perceptions	of	planning;	population	size;	and	Green-party	voters.		Where	these	factors	
are	not	present,	support	may	be	needed	for	local	governments	to	take	land	use	actions	that	
would	successfully	implement	SB	375	and	support	that	region’s	SCS.			
• While	a	visible	segment	of	local	governments	has	successfully	availed	themselves	of	the	
grant	funding	available	to	support	SB	375	implementation,	many	are	not	aware	such	
programs	exist.		This	may	suggest	that	additional	outreach	or	education	targeted	at	local	
governments	may	help	publicize	the	availability	of	such	funds	and	promote	their	use.			
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Appendix	A	–	Local	Government	Survey	Results	
 
Table	A-1.	Additional	details	on	the	key	attributes	of	each	MPO	region,	including	the	number	
of	jurisdictions	within	its	boundary,	land	coverage,	and	population.	
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Figure	A-1.	MPO	Areas	in	California.	(Source:	http://www.ca-ilg.org/sites/main/files/file-
attachments/mpo_rtpa_map_sept2012.pdf)	
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Table	A-2.	Invited	Population	of	Local	Governments	and	Responding	Sample 
		 Small	MPOs	 “Big	Four”	MPOs	 All	MPOs	 TOTAL	
	 Counties	 Cities	 Counties	 Cities	 Counties	 Cities	
Total	(Invited)	 17	 104	 22	 331	 39	 435	 474	
Total	Responding	 6	 41	 16	 117	 22	 158	 180	
Percent	Responding	 35%	 39%	 73%	 35%	 56%	 36%	 38%	
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Table	A-3.	Planning	Manager	Perceptions	of	SB	375’s	Influence	in	City	/	County	Adopting	or	Strengthening	Zoning	Strategies	
	 Total	
	
City	
	
County	
	
1	(No	
Influence)	 2	 3	 4	
5	(Very	
Strong)	 N	
1	(No	
Influence)	 2	 3	 4	
5	(Very	
Strong)	 N	
1	(No	
Influence)	 2	 3	 4	
5	(Very	
Strong)	 N	
Increased	Building	Densities	(Q8.1)		 49.3	19.6	 16.9	12.8	 1.4	148	 	 50.0	 20.0	17.7	 10.8	 1.5	 130	 	 44.4	16.7	 11.1	 27.8	 0.0	 18	
Increased	Building	Heights	(Q8.2)	 52.0	 23.5	 14.3	 8.2	 2.0	 98	 	 52.4	 25.0	11.9	 8.3	 2.4	 84	 	 50.0	 14.3	 28.6	 7.1	 0.0	 14	
Infill	Development	(Q8.3	)	 44.4	15.6	 25.6	11.9	 2.5	160	 	 44.3	15.7	 26.4	 10.7	 2.9	 140	 	 45.0	15.0	 20.0	 20.0	 0.0	 20	
Urban	Growth	Boundary	(Q8.4)	 72.1	 14.8	 4.9	 6.6	 1.6	 61	 	 68.4	 15.8	 5.3	 7.9	 2.6	 38	 	 61.5	 23.1	 7.7	 7.7	 0.0	 13	
Mixed-Use	Development	(Q8.5)	 44.1	18.0	 21.1	15.5	 1.2	161	 	 43.6	19.3	 20.7	 15.0	 1.4	 140	 	 47.6	 9.5	 23.8	 19.0	 0.0	 21	
Transit-Oriented	Development	(Q8.6)	 35.4	24.2	 17.2	19.2	 4.0	 99	 	 35.7	26.2	 15.5	 17.9	 4.8	 84	 	 33.3	 13.3	26.7	 26.7	 0.0	 15	
Reduce	or	Eliminate	Minimum	Parking	
Requirements	(Q8.7)	 53.5	 18.8	 13.9	11.9	 2.0	101	 	 54.7	 19.8	10.5	 12.8	 2.3	 86	 	 46.7	13.3	 33.3	 6.7	 0.0	 15	
Preservation	of	Agricultural	or	Open	
Space	Lands	(Q8.8)	 66.7	 18.6	 5.4	 7.0	 2.3	129	 	 68.5	 14.8	 6.5	 8.3	 1.9	 108	 	 57.1	 38.1	 0.0	 0.0	 4.8	 21	
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Table	A-4.	Anticipated	Impacts	of	RTP/SCS	Implementation	on	California	Cities	and	Counties	
	 Total	
	
City	
	
County	
	
No	
Impact	 A	Little	 Some	 A	lot	 Substantial	 N	 No	Impact	 A	Little	 Some	A	lot	 Substantial	N	 No	Impact	A	Little	 Some	A	lot	 Substantial	N	
Less	air	pollution	(Q19.1)	 12.7	 22.0	 49.1	 12.1	 4.0	 173	 	 13.2	 23.8	 48.3	 11.9	 2.6	 151	 	 9.1	 9.1	 54.5	 13.6	 13.6	 22	
More	open	space	(Q19.2)	 31.8	 20.2	 37.0	 7.5	 3.5	 173	 	 33.8	 21.9	 36.4	 5.3	 2.6	 151	 	 18.2	 9.1	 40.9	 22.7	 9.1	 22	
Higher	housing	prices	
(Q19.3)	 37.6	 26.6	 26.0	 9.2	 0.6	 173	 	 37.1	 27.8	 24.5	 10.6	 0.0	 151	 	 40.9	 18.2	 36.4	 0.0	 4.5	 22	
More	transport	funds	
(Q19.4)	 23.7	 29.5	 33.5	 10.4	 2.9	 173	 	 23.8	 29.8	 33.8	 10.6	 2.0	 151	 	 22.7	 27.3	 31.8	 9.1	 9.1	 22	
Attract	businesses		
and	jobs	(Q19.5)	 32.9	 27.2	 30.1	 8.7	 1.2	 173	 	 35.1	 25.2	 30.5	 9.3	 0.0	 151	 	 18.2	 40.9	 27.3	 4.5	 9.1	 22	
Displace	vulnerable	
populations	(Q19.6)	 54.3	 21.4	 18.5	 5.8	 0.0	 173	 	 57.6	 23.2	 14.6	 4.6	 0.0	 151	 	 31.8	 9.1	 45.5	 13.6	 0.0	 22	
Improve	public	health	
(Q19.7)	 17.3	 30.6	 41.6	 8.7	 1.7	 173	 	 18.5	 34.4	 37.1	 9.3	 0.7	 151	 	 9.1	 4.5	 72.7	 4.5	 9.1	 22	
More	transportation	
choices	(Q19.8)	 12.7	 23.7	 40.5	 18.5	 4.6	 173	 	 13.9	 25.2	 37.7	 19.2	 4.0	 151	 	 4.5	 13.6	 59.1	 13.6	 9.1	 22	
Lose	economic	dev.	to	
neighbors	(Q19.9)	 53.2	 25.4	 16.2	 4.0	 1.2	 173	 	 55.6	 24.5	 15.9	 3.3	 0.7	 151	 	 36.4	 31.8	 18.2	 9.1	 4.5	 22	
Lower	quality	of	life	
(Q19.10)	 69.4	 18.5	 9.8	 1.2	 1.2	 173	 	 69.5	 19.2	 9.3	 1.3	 0.7	 151	 	 68.2	 13.6	 13.6	 0.0	 4.5	 22	
Increased	housing	choices	
(Q19.11)	 15.0	 28.9	 37.0	 17.3	 1.7	 173	 	 16.6	 30.5	 34.4	 17.2	 1.3	 151	 	 4.5	 18.2	 54.5	 18.2	 4.5	 22	
Drive	businesses	away	
(Q19.12)	 61.3	 23.1	 13.9	 0.6	 1.2	 173	 	 59.6	 23.8	 14.6	 0.7	 1.3	 151	 	 72.7	 18.2	 9.1	 0.0	 0.0	 22	
Increase	congestion	
(Q19.13)	 31.8	 26.0	 34.1	 6.4	 1.7	 173	 	 31.1	 26.5	 34.4	 6.0	 2.0	 151	 	 36.4	 22.7	 31.8	 9.1	 0.0	 22	
Residents	live	closer	to	
jobs	(Q19.14)	 17.9	 35.3	 34.7	 9.2	 2.9	 173	 	 19.2	 35.8	 34.4	 8.6	 2.0	 151	 	 9.1	 31.8	 36.4	 13.6	 9.1	 22	
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Table	A-5.	Local	Government	(LG)	Engagement	in	and	Perceptions	of	the	Regional	Transportation	Planning	(RTP/SCS)	Process	
	 Total	 	 City	 	 County	
	
Strongly	
Disagree	 Disagree	 Neutral	 Agree	
Strongly	
Agree	 N	 	
Strongly	
Disagree	 Disagree	 Neutral	 Agree	
Strongly	
Agree	 N	 	
Strongly	
Disagree	 Disagree	 Neutral	 Agree	
Strongly	
Agree	 N	
LG	understands	RTP/SCS	
participation	opportunities	(Q5.1)		 1.2	 1.8	 11.1	 61.4	 24.6	171	 	 1.3	 1.3	 10.7	 62.7	 24.0	 150	 	 0.0	 4.8	 14.3	 52.4	 28.6	 21	
LG	participated	in	RTP/SCS	
development	(Q5.2)	 1.8	 11.5	 19.4	 49.7	 17.6	165	 	 2.1	 12.3	 20.5	 48.6	 16.4	 146	 	 0.0	 5.3	 10.5	 57.9	 26.3	 19	
MPO	considered	LG’s	input	(Q5.3)	
0.7	 2.1	 33.3	 47.2	 16.7	144	 	 0.8	 2.4	 33.9	 47.2	 15.7	 127	 	 0.0	 0.0	 29.4	 47.1	 23.5	 17	
LG	participation	had	no	impact	on	
RTP/SCS	(Q5.4	)	 5.6	 40.6	 37.8	 14.0	 2.1	143	 	 5.6	 40.0	 40.0	 12.0	 2.4	 125	 	 5.6	 44.4	 22.2	 27.8	 0.0	 18	
LG	is	aware	of	any	priority	
development	areas	(Q5.5)	 3.0	 7.3	 12.1	 55.2	 22.4	165	 	 3.4	 7.6	 11.0	 57.2	 20.7	 145	 	 0.0	 5.0	 20.0	 40.0	 35.0	 20	
MPO	board	decisions	unfair	(Q5.6)	
4.7	 26.2	 41.6	 20.8	 6.7	149	 	 5.3	 26.7	 42.7	 20.6	 4.6	 131	 	 0.0	 22.2	 33.3	 22.2	 22.2	 18	
LG	plans	differ	from	RTP/SCS	(Q5.7)	
7.6	 43.3	 24.2	 18.5	 6.4	157	 	 7.2	 42.8	 26.1	 17.4	 6.5	 138	 	 10.5	 47.4	 10.5	 26.3	 5.3	 19	
Other	LGs	will	ignore	RTP/SCS	
(Q5.8)	 3.1	 26.0	 39.7	 25.2	 6.1	131	 	 2.6	 25.9	 37.9	 26.7	 6.9	 116	 	 6.7	 26.7	 53.3	 13.3	 0.0	 15	
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Table	A-6.	How	would	you	characterize	the	overall	positions	of	stakeholders	in	your	jurisdiction	regarding	the	statements?	
	 Total	
	
City	
	
County	
	
Fully	
Oppose	
Mostly	
Oppose	
Even	
Split	
Mostly	
Support	
Fully	
Support	 N	
Fully	
Oppose	
Mostly	
Oppose	
Even	
Split	
Mostly	
Support	
Fully	
Support	 N	
Fully	
Oppose	
Mostly	
Oppose	
Even	
Split	
Mostly	
Support	
Fully	
Support	 N	
Land	use	should	support	
alt.	Transportation	
(Q12.1)	
1.2	 3.6	 20.2	 54.8	 20.2	 168	 	 1.4	 4.1	 18.4	 55.8	 20.4	 147	 	 0.0	 0.0	 33.3	 47.6	 19.0	 21	
LG	needs	development	
for	tax	revenue	(Q12.2)	 1.7	 4.0	 19.5	 34.5	 40.2	 174	 	 2.0	 3.3	 19.0	 33.3	 42.5	 153	 	 0.0	 9.5	 23.8	 42.9	 23.8	 21	
Human	activity	causing	
climate	change	(Q12.3)	 7.6	 32.2	 38.0	 15.2	 7.0	 171	 	 8.7	 32.0	 38.0	 15.3	 6.0	 150	 	 0.0	 33.3	 38.1	 14.3	 14.3	 21	
LG	must	develop	more	
densely	(Q12.4)	 5.5	 31.5	 40.6	 17.6	 4.8	 165	 	 6.3	 34.0	 39.6	 16.0	 4.2	 144	 	 0.0	 14.3	 47.6	 28.6	 9.5	 21	
LG	has	too	many	
development	restrictions	
(Q12.5)	
7.1	 38.1	 36.3	 15.5	 3.0	 168	 	 8.2	 38.8	 35.4	 15.0	 2.7	 147	 	 0.0	 33.3	 42.9	 19.0	 4.8	 21	
Infill	development	
threatens	community	
character	(Q12.6)	
3.4	 10.2	 26.5	 42.2	 17.7	 147	 	 3.9	 11.0	 24.4	 44.9	 15.7	 127	 	 0.0	 5.0	 40.0	 25.0	 30.0	 20	
LG	should	prioritize	road	
projects	(Q12.7)		 2.6	 6.5	 28.6	 36.4	 26.0	 154	 	 3.0	 3.7	 28.9	 34.8	 29.6	 135	 	 0.0	 26.3	 26.3	 47.4	 0.0	 19	
Too	much	state	influence	
over	land	use/dev.	
(Q12.8)	
4.4	 16.9	 26.9	 35.6	 16.3	 160	 	 3.6	 18.0	 26.6	 35.3	 16.5	 139	 	 9.5	 9.5	 28.6	 38.1	 14.3	 21	
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Table	A-7.	Do	Local	Governments	Share	Land	Use	&	Development	Information	with	Their	MPO	
	 Total	
	
City	
	
County	
	 We	Don't	Collect	No	 Yes	 N	 We	Don't	Collect	No	 Yes	 N	 We	Don't	Collect	 No	 Yes	 N	
Zoning	and	Land	Use	Maps	(Q14.1)		 3.0	 7.8	 89.2	 166	 	 2.1	 8.3	 89.6	 144	 	 9.1	 4.5	 86.4	 22	
Development	Proposals	(Q14.2)	 3.7	 32.7	 63.6	 162	 	 2.8	 32.6	 64.6	 144	 	 11.1	 33.3	 55.6	 18	
Proposed	Zoning	Changes	(Q14.3)	 3.7	 36.6	 59.6	 161	 	 3.6	 36.4	 60.0	 140	 	 4.8	 38.1	 57.1	 21	
Proposed	General	Plan	Amendments	(Q14.4)	 3.7	 28.4	 67.9	 162	 	 3.5	 28.2	 68.3	 142	 	 5.0	 30.0	 65.0	 20	
LAFCo	Proposals	(Q14.5)	 8.5	 23.4	 68.1	 141	 	 8.0	 23.2	 68.8	 125	 	 12.5	 25.0	 62.5	 16	
	
	
	
Table	A-8.	Perceptions	of	Information	Costs:	Neighboring	Jurisdictions	Land	Use	and	Development	Decisions	
	 Total	
	
City	
	
County	
	
Strongly	
Disagree	 Disagree	Neutral	Agree	
Strongly	
Agree	 N	
Strongly	
Disagree	 Disagree	Neutral	Agree	
Strongly	
Agree	 N	
Strongly	
Disagree	 Disagree	Neutral	Agree	
Strongly	
Agree	 N	
Easy	to	learn	about	
neighbors’	development	
decisions	(Q15.1)		 0.6	 15.6	 25.1	 50.9	 7.8	167	 	 3.3	 14.6	 24.5	 49.7	 7.9	151	 	 0.0	 20.0	 25.0	 50.0	 5.0	 20	
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Table A-9. Extent of Local Government Collaboration with Other Jurisdictions or Stakeholders on Shared issues 
	 Total	 	 City	 	 County	
	
Not	At	
All	
A	
Little	 Somewhat	Alot	
A	Great	
Deal	 N	 	
Not	At	
All	
A	
Little	 Somewhat	Alot	
A	Great	
Deal	 N	 	
Not	At	
All	
A	
Little	 Somewhat	Alot	
A	Great	
Deal	 N	
Municipal	Service	Sharing	(Q17.1)	 17.7	 25.1	 34.3	 18.3	 4.6	 175	 	 17.0	 26.8	 34.6	 17.0	 4.6	 153	 	 22.7	 13.6	 31.8	 27.3	 4.5	 22	
Regional	Workforce	Development	
(Q17.2)	 23.4	 30.3	 29.1	 14.9	 2.3	 175	 	 25.5	 30.7	 28.8	 13.1	 2.0	 153	 	 9.1	 27.3	 31.8	 27.3	 4.5	 22	
Economic	Development	(Q17.3)	 16.6	 24.6	 33.7	 20.6	 4.6	 175	 	 17.6	 26.1	 32.7	 19.6	 3.9	 153	 	 9.1	 13.6	 40.9	 27.3	 9.1	 22	
Community	Development/Housing	
(Q17.4)	 20.6	 33.1	 29.1	 14.3	 2.9	 175	 	 18.2	 36.4	 31.5	 12.6	 1.4	 153	 	 0.0	 27.3	 27.3	 31.8	 13.6	 22	
Water	Management	(Q17.5)	 12.0	 13.1	 28.6	 36.0	 10.3	 175	 	 11.1	 13.7	 30.1	 35.9	 9.2	 153	 	 18.2	 9.1	 18.2	 36.4	 18.2	 22	
Land	or	Habitat	Conservation	
(Q17.6)	 22.9	 24.0	 29.1	 18.3	 5.7	 175	 	 24.8	 24.8	 28.8	 19.0	 2.6	 153	 	 9.1	 18.2	 31.8	 13.6	 27.3	 22	
Climate	Action	or	Other	
Environmental	Issues	(Q17.7)	 19.4	 29.1	 34.3	 12.0	 5.1	 175	 	 20.9	 31.4	 33.3	 11.1	 3.3	 153	 	 9.1	 13.6	 40.9	 18.2	 18.2	 22	
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Table A-10. Local Government Awareness, Pursuit, and Receipt of Outside Grants for RTP/SCS Implementation 
	 	 Total 	 City 	 County 
	
	
Not 
Aware 
Aware, 
Not 
Applied 
Applied, 
Not 
Awarded 
Funding 
Applied, 
Awarded 
Funding N/A N 	
Not 
Aware 
Aware, 
Not 
Applied 
Applied, 
Not 
Awarded 
Funding 
Applied, 
Awarded 
Funding N/A N 	
Not 
Aware 
Aware, 
Not 
Applied 
Applied, 
Not 
Awarded 
Funding 
Applied, 
Awarded 
Funding N/A N 
St
at
e	
AHSC	(Q18.1)	 24.9	 47.5	 8.5	 11.3	 7.9	 177	 	 25.2	 49.0	 7.7	 9.7	 8.4	 155	 	 22.7	 36.4	 13.6	 22.7	 4.5	 22	
ATP	(Q18.2)	 29.4	 22.0	 11.9	 28.2	 8.5	 177	 	 28.4	 21.9	 11.6	 31.0	 7.1	 155	 	 36.4	 22.7	 13.6	 9.1	 18.2	 22	
Caltrans	
Sustainable	
Planning		
(Q18.3)	 33.3	 27.7	 9.0	 22.6	 7.3	 177	 	 31.6	 28.4	 8.4	 25.2	 6.5	 155	 	 45.5	 22.7	 13.6	 4.5	 13.6	 22	
Re
gi
on
al
	 MPO's	ATP	
(Q18.4)	 35.0	 19.2	 10.2	 26.6	 9.0	 177	 	 31.6	 20.6	 11.0	 28.4	 8.4	 155	 	 59.1	 9.1	 4.5	 13.6	 13.6	 22	
MPO	other	
program	(Q18.5)	 46.9	 18.6	 1.1	 22.0	 11.3	 177	 	 45.2	 20.0	 1.3	 23.2	 10.3	 155	 	 59.1	 9.1	 0.0	 13.6	 18.2	 22	
Fe
de
ra
l	
Any	Federal	
Grant	(Q18.6)		 45.8	 14.7	 2.8	 14.7	 22.0	 177	 	 45.2	 15.5	 3.2	 13.5	 22.6	 155	 	 50.0	 9.1	 0.0	 22.7	 18.2	 22	
Fo
un
da
tio
n	
/	
O
th
er
	
Foundation	or	
Non-Profit	Grant	
(Q18.7)	 51.4	 12.4	 1.7	 5.6	 28.8	 177	 	 52.3	 12.3	 1.9	 4.5	 29.0	 155	 	 45.5	 13.6	 0.0	 13.6	 27.3	 22	
Any	Other	Grant	
(Q18.8)	 52.5	 9.0	 1.7	 10.2	 26.6	 177	 	 52.9	 9.7	 1.9	 9.7	 25.8	 155	 	 50.0	 4.5	 0.0	 13.6	 31.8	 22	
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Table A-11. Do Local Governments Attribute Regional Outcomes to SB 375? 
	 Total 
	
City 
	
County 
	
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree N 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree N 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree N 
Our	LG	
participates	more	
(Q20.1)	 2.5	 14.6	 30.6	 42.7	 9.6	157	 	 2.9	 16.2	 31.6	 41.9	 7.4	 136	 	 0.0	 4.8	 23.8	 47.6	 23.8	 21	
More	
communication	
among	LGs	and	
actors	(Q20.2)	 3.1	 11.9	 25.2	 51.6	 8.2	159	 	 3.6	 13.8	 25.4	 50.0	 7.2	 138	 	 0.0	 0.0	 23.8	 61.9	 14.3	 21	
Reduced	car	
dependence	
(Q20.3)	 3.7	 16.0	 36.4	 36.4	 7.4	162	 	 4.3	 17.0	 35.5	 36.2	 7.1	 141	 	 0.0	 9.5	 42.9	 38.1	 9.5	 21	
Increased	MPO	
influence	(Q20.4)	 3.2	 24.5	 47.7	 18.1	 6.5	155	 	 3.7	 23.1	 50.0	 18.7	 4.5	 134	 	 0.0	 33.3	 33.3	 14.3	 19.0	 21	
No	impact	on	
local	
development	
(Q20.5)	 4.8	 33.9	 26.1	 25.5	 9.7	165	 	 5.6	 33.6	 23.8	 26.6	 10.5	 143	 	 0.0	 36.4	 40.9	 18.2	 4.5	 22	
	
